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Abstract 
Evaluators, implementers, and financial partners are increasingly concerned about their confidence 
that contribution claims made by Lobby and Advocacy (L&A) programs are being confirmed. This 
paper draws lessons learnt from the evaluations of both international and national L&A efforts for 
which a Theory Based Evaluation (TBE) methodology was developed, inspired by Process Tracing and 
Contribution Analysis. 
Glossary 
BtB  Behind the Brands 
CBFM  Community Based Forest Management 
CDI  Centre for Development Innovation 
CECOEDECON Centre for Community Economics and Development Consultants Society ( 
CRI  Combine Resource Institute 
CS  Civil Society 
CSO  Civil Society Organisation 
CWM  Centre for Workers Management 
ELSAM  Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy 
FBC  Food and Beverage Company 
GB  Great Brittan 
GMS  Genetically Modified Seeds 
IFC  International Finance Corporation 
IP  Indigenous People 
KKI-WARSI Indonesian Conservation Community WARSI 
L&A  Lobby and Advocacy 
LSLA  Large Scale Land Acquisition 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
NNET  Network of Northeast Tribes 
NTFP-EP Non Timber Forest Products – Exchange Program Indonesia 
MoH  Ministry of Health 
OEPT  Outcome Explaining Process Tracing 
REDS  Rural & Environment Development Society 
TBE  Theory Based Evaluation 
ToC  Theory of Change 
 
 
 
 
 
Setting the stage 
Between 2011 and 2015, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs financed 20 Dutch NGO alliances with 
€1.9 billion to strengthen civil society in overseas countries and to reduce structural poverty. Most 
alliances jointly organised their mandatory external evaluation. This consisted of assessing impacts in 
eight countries with regards to: 1) Millennium Development Goals, 2) capacity development of their 
overseas partners, and 3) civil society (CS) strengthening by these partners using the CIVICUS 
framework1, as well as a separate impact assessment of eight L&A programs. All evaluations included 
a base line study in 2012  and an end line assessment in 20142.  
The Centre for Development Innovation (CDI) of Wageningen University and Research centre3, 
together with evaluation partners in India and Indonesia assessed the CS component, including 
Lobby and Advocacy (L&A) contributions and two international campaigns implemented by Oxfam 
Novib. A theory-based evaluation (TBE) methodology was developed for this purpose.  
This paper draws lessons with regards to this methodology that attempted to increase the 
confidence with which contribution claims can be confirmed or rejected. This first section presents 
the evaluation background, followed by a presentation of the evaluation methodology. The third 
draws lessons with regards to the methodology, followed by a discussion in the fourth section and 
conclusions in the last section.  
Lobby and advocacy defined 
L&A consists of a wide range of activities conducted to influence decision-makers or lobby targets in 
addressing structural causes of poverty and injustice. It challenges social, political, policy and power 
structures (Morariu and Brennan in: Barret et al, 2016). Important strategies often used are ‘outsider 
strategies’ (advocacy) that aim to mobilise the general public, that can be combined with ‘insider 
strategies’ (lobby) that search to engage directly with the decision-maker (Sloot and Gaanderse, 
2010). L&A outcomes are formulated in terms of observable changes in the policies, practices, 
behaviours, relationships, actions, or mind-sets of an individual, group, community, organisation or 
institution (Wilson-Grau and Britt, 2012; Barret et al, 2016). The call for the international L&A 
evaluation specified three outcome categories: Those related to 1) setting the agenda of decision-
makers; 2) policy changes and; 3) changing the practices of decision-makers.  
Features of L&A projects 
Ten overseas partners engaged in L&A efforts in India and Indonesia and two international 
campaigns. Annex 1 gives more background information on each project or campaign, and 
                                                          
1
 The CIVICUS framework assesses the space for civil society to thrive in five dimensions; (inclusive) civic engagement; level 
of the organisational strength of civil society at large; practice of values; civil society impact, amongst which influencing 
public and private sector policies and practices and; the environmental context in which civil society operates (Mati J.M., 
Silva F. and Anderson T. April 2010). 
2
 All evaluation reports can be found at https://partos.nl/joint-MFSII-evaluations 
3
 CDI conducted capacity development assessments in India, Indonesia, Ethiopia and Liberia;  civil society strengthening 
assessments in India, Indonesia and Ethiopia (29 programs) and the assessment of four international lobby and advocacy 
programs on economic justice. Given the political situation in Ethiopia, civil society organisations supported by foreign 
NGOs are not allowed to engage in L&A, explaining why potential L&A efforts were not assessed. 
 
 
summarises the conclusions with regards to their contribution. The projects cover a wide range of 
issues, which are presented in table 1.  
Table 1 
Overview of the overseas partners and their attempts to achieve outcomes 
Overseas partner/campaign Outcomes 
Centre for Community Economics and Development 
Consultants Society (CECOEDECON) 
 Stop field trials with genetically modified seeds (GMO) 
 Obtain minimum support prices for agricultural commodities  
Rural & Environment Development Society (REDS) More land titles and acreage for indigenous people (IP)  
Centre for Workers Management (CWM) Increase minimum wages in the garment sector 
Network of Northeast Tribes (NNET) Increase access to public schemes for IP  
Combine Resource Institute (CRI) Increase access to public health insurance scheme  
Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM) Amendment by National Parliament of the 2006 Indonesian 
Law on Witnesses and Victim Protection 
Non Timber Forest Products – Exchange Program 
Indonesia (NTFP-EP) 
Obtain forest concession rights and permits for IP 
Indonesian Conservation Community WARSI (KKI-
WARSI) 
 Obtain forest concession rights and permits for IP 
 Mainstream Community Based Forest Management into 
provincial forestry policy 
Oxfam Confederation  Reduce land grabbing irresponsible large scale land 
acquisitions (LSLA), by amongst others the International 
Finance Corporation 
 Behind the Brands (BtB) campaign. Engage the ten biggest 
Food and Beverage Companies (FBC) in a ‘race to the top’ to 
mainstream gender in their value chains and stop land 
grabbing.  
Evaluation results 
Annex 1 also concludes that most L&A efforts are part of a causal package, in which they played a 
substantial role. In three projects there was no sufficient evidence of L&A activities explaining an 
outcome. The evaluation also yielded the following conclusions with regards to contribution.  
In the first place, strong organisations are more successful: They are knowledgeable on the themes 
they address, they use appropriate L&A strategies and they avail of the legitimacy from their 
constituencies and lobby targets to act. 
In the second place, changes in public and private sector agendas, policies and practices are often the 
result of L&A implemented before the period under evaluation. Likewise, interventions undertaken 
in the 2011-2015 period may not yet yield results before 2015, but after it.  
In the third place, decision-makers themselves are occasionally part of the causal package because 
the agendas of both the project and its targets are already aligned to some extent. In these cases the 
distinction between cause and effect seems blurred, with 
special features of the effect (lobby target) also being part 
of the causal factor.  
In the fourth place, L&A outcomes often are the result of 
nonlinear changes, requiring systemic approaches that 
involve many actors, and may depend upon triggering 
factors and context factors. 
Oxfam’s land grab campaign:  
A trigger that helped this campaign to 
achieve outcomes with the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) consisted of  many 
CSOs and NGOs reaching out to the global 
media with a message that linked the IFC as 
an investor to an international corporation 
in Honduras, involved in human rights 
atrocities and land grabbing. 
 
 
Evaluation methodology 
The methodology was inspired by the evaluation questions in the calls for proposal and a literature 
review on TBEs, contribution analysis and process tracing. This section presents the evaluation 
questions and then continues with a contextual literature review, drawing upon it develop to the 
appropriate evaluation methodology.  
Evaluation questions 
In each call for proposals, the first two evaluation questions provided clarity on how to assess the 
effectiveness of CS and L&A efforts. Both calls formulated the first evaluation question in terms of: 
‘What are the changes achieved in ...... in the 2012-2014 period’ 
This question typically required the inventory of outcomes achieved with regards to CS strengthening 
for the in-country assessments and with regards to agenda setting, policy changes and changing 
practices for the international L&A programs.  
Both calls differed however with regards to the second question, meant to address the effectiveness 
of the program: 
 ‘To what degree are the changes identified in CS attributable to the overseas partners, 
financed through the Dutch grant framework?’ 
 Do the international L&A efforts financed by the Dutch grant framework contribute to the 
identified changes?’ 
Measuring ‘attribution’ for the CS component caused a debate in the Dutch evaluation community in 
early 2012. Both the interpretation of ‘attribution’ and the international debate on the ‘gold 
standard’ for impact evaluations prompted the evaluators to search for a counterfactual evaluation 
designs. This proved however impossible for CS, given the complex nature of changes in CS, as well as 
the absence of control groups: A TBE design was finally developed (Stern et al, 2012), assessing 
contributions.  
In consequence, for both evaluations the central questions with regards to effectiveness can be 
subsumed in the following three interconnected evaluation questions:  
 ‘What were the outcomes achieved?’ 
 Did the L&A efforts financed by the Dutch grant framework contribute to these outcomes?  
 How did these efforts make a difference?  
Literature review 
The literature review in 2013 looked in particular at contribution analysis and process tracing as 
examples of TBE. Four issues were identified: the ultimate aim of TBEs; the selection of outcomes, 
and suggestions to increase the internal validity or confidence with which cause-effect relations can 
be confirmed or rejected.  
The first issue highlights the aim of a TBE; to understand what works and what doesn’t under what 
conditions and why (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Collier, 2011; Mayne, 2012). Beach & Pederson (2013) 
distinguish three purposes for which process-tracing can be useful: 1) testing theories, 2) building 
theories and 3) explaining outcomes, which is a combination of theory-testing and building. This last 
Outcome-Explaining Process Tracing (OEPT) purpose seeks to identify a minimally sufficient 
explanation of a particular outcome in a particular case and it was aligned with the two evaluation 
questions above.  
 
 
The second point is particularly relevant for outcome explaining evaluations and consists of warning 
evaluators against the bias of  selecting only positive outcomes: Time, a deeper understanding of the 
context, and available resources often force evaluators to select some outcomes, hence potentially 
causing a bias (Stern et al., 2012; Patton, 2012; Oxfam GB, 2013; Wilson-Grau & Britt, 2012).  
The third issue is about the Theory of Change (ToC). Mayne (2012, p. 27), Oxfam GB (2013), and 
White and Phillips (2012, p. 30) re-construct the ex-ante ToC, whereas OEPT constructs an ex-post 
causal mechanism for outcomes achieved (Beach & Pedersen, 2013)4. Both approaches though, be 
they ex-ante or ex-post, aim at identifying explanatory causes for the outcomes achieved. 
The fourth issue addresses how the confidence level in contribution claims can be raised, which 
happens to be a major concern for qualitative impact evaluations. Stern et al. (2012) suggest in the 
first place that data should be rigorous, traceable, and credible, before they can be admitted as a 
piece of evidence. The following suggestions further increase the validity of contribution claims:  
 Identifying causal inference beyond statistical correlations: Stern et al (2012) conclude that 
most development interventions are part of a causal package that includes other actors and 
factors that together are minimally sufficient to explain an effect. Within that causal package 
the role of the intervention needs to be further specified. Stern et al (2012), Mayne (2012)5, 
Beach and Pederson (2013) all differentiate cause-effect relations in terms of causes being 
necessary and/or sufficient for the explanation of an effect6.  
 Bayesian theorem and process-tracing tests: Process-tracing explicitly makes use of Bayesian 
logic and works with tests that help to orient 
data collection towards those that have a strong 
potential to confirm or reject contribution 
claims: It is not the quantity of evidence 
collected that is important, but its quality 
(Bennet, 2008). Bayesian logic expresses the 
confidence evaluators have in the collected 
evidence to explain or reject a causal claim in a 
percentage: If confidence is higher after data 
collection than before, the probability that the 
causal claim exists has increased (Beach and 
Pederson, 2013, page 83). Also the tests orient 
data-collection on beforehand and help to 
assess the strength of pieces of evidence found 
afterwards (Collier, 2011; van Evera, in Beach 
and Pederson, 2013, page 103).  
 Typology of data to be collected: Beach and Pedersen (2013) emphasize that pattern, 
sequence, trace and account evidence in particular help to assess causal inference.  
This review informed the design of the methodology, which combined both elements of contribution 
analysis and OEPT. In line with OEPT and the first evaluation question, an inventory was made of all 
                                                          
4
 For practical reasons we understand causal mechanism as a part of relations in a wider ToC 
5
 Not yet elaborated in Mayne in 2008 
6
 The concept of necessary and sufficient causes has been developed since the late 70
ties
,  and recently gained the further 
interest of qualitative researchers 
Process-tracing tests 
Doubly-decisive test: If evidence has been 
found it confirms the causal relation and 
eliminates alternative explanations. If it has 
not been found the relation is being 
rejected.  
Hoop test: If evidence has been found, the 
causal relation still needs to be taken into 
consideration, but it has not been 
confirmed. If evidence is missing the causal 
relation is rejected.  
Smoking gun test: If evidence is found it 
confirms the causal relation, but if it is not 
found than the causal relation is not 
confirmed, nor rejected.  
Straw-in-the-wind test: If evidence is found, 
it does not confirm the causal relation; if it is 
not found this does not reject the causal 
relation.  
 
 
outcomes achieved, an ex-post ToC was constructed for selected outcomes, and an explicit step was 
built in to first reflect on data needed to confirm or reject causal claims. After data collection the 
analysis however did not use the process tracing tests, but looked at causes being necessary and/or 
sufficient for the explanation of an outcome which is more akin to contribution analysis. The 
following section presents the evaluation methodology used. 
Evaluation methodology used 
The following describes the methodology that guided the evaluations.   
Step 1: Select outcome (cluster) for contribution analysis. All evaluations started with the inventory of 
outcomes achieved between 2011 and 2014, including a precise description and evidence. For the 
country evaluations, selection criteria were developed on beforehand to prevent a bias towards 
positive outcomes7. For the global campaigns, the relevance of the outcome in the ToC was an 
important criteria for the land grab campaign. The BtB in-depth assessment included all outcomes 
achieved, including non-expected outcomes, with the FBCs.  
Step 2: Construct the Theory of Change: An ex-post ToC was constructed to explain the outcome 
(cluster), including the causal pathway of the project and alternative pathways.  
Step 3: Identify data needed to confirm or reject causal pathways. The evaluators were asked to 
behave as detectives, urging them to identify those data needed to confirm or reject causal relations, 
including pattern, sequence, trace or account evidence.   
Based upon project documents, also an analysis was made of major outputs realised and outcomes 
achieved for the CS projects.  
Step 4: Collect data. Interviews, workshops with the overseas partners and project documentation 
provided the first data sets. External resource persons provided the second set of data. In principle 
no interviews were organised with lobby targets, because the risk of obtaining biased information 
was considered high (Wilson-Grau and Britt, 2012) and because an evaluator might harm existing 
relations and processes between the campaigners and their targets. Internet searches provided the 
third data sets, helping to understand the context and identify other actors engaged in the change. 
Step 5: Organise data and assess their quality. All data were compiled in a table listing all possible 
causal pathways and then classifying them in terms of confirming or rejecting these pathways. Data 
were also classified in terms of providing rigorous, traceable and credible information, according to a 
traffic light system (Inspired by Delahais and Toulemonde, 2012).  
Table 2 
Organisation of information collected per causal pathway 
Causal pathway 
(project and 
alternatives) 
Information that confirms (parts of) this 
pathway 
Information that rejects (parts of) this 
pathway 
Pathway 1 Information 1 Source of information  Information 1 Source of information  
Pathway 2 Information 1 Source of information  Information 1 Source of information  
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 Due to resource only 50 % of the overseas partners underwent an in-depth impact assessment, for the others the 
outcome harvesting method (Wilson-Grau, 2012) was used. For those included in the assessment, a maximum of two 
outcomes were selected, of which at least one was the result of L&A in India and Indonesia. Finally the selected outcome 
also had to be relevant with regards to Dutch funding and the organisation’s ToC. 
 
 
Pathway 3 Information 1 Source of information  Information 1 Source of information  
Source: Inspired by Oxfam GB, 2013 
Step 6: Explaining the outcome(s) achieved. This step assessed the causal relations between different 
parts in the ToC in terms of being necessary or unnecessary causes, and/or being a sufficient or 
insufficient cause. One additional relation was added, that of causes being unnecessary and 
insufficient.  
Step 7: Assess the contribution and role of the project and Dutch funding. With the outcome having 
been explained in the previous step, here the role of the overseas partner in that explanation was 
answered in terms of being sufficient, necessary or part of a causal package, followed by the 
specification of its role in the package. The last step consisted of assessing the contribution of Dutch 
funding had to be assessed, given financial contributions by other partners. 
With this seven-step methodology we started the contribution analysis. The following section 
presents our experiences and lessons learned.  
Increasing confidence in contribution claims 
The aforementioned methodology helped to increase the confidence with which contribution claims 
were accepted or rejected, but also faced several challenges. This section first explains what worked, 
what challenges were encountered with regards to the methodology and with regards to the nature 
of L&A. 
What worked to increase confidence in contribution claims 
Three elements enhanced our confidence in the contribution claims:  
Clustering outcomes to compare contributions made (step 1): Some projects listed many outcomes 
achieved. Examples of these are KKI-WARSI (18 outcomes), Oxfam’s land grab (20 outcomes8) and 
BtB campaign (25 outcomes). Clustering of outcomes that would be the result of the same pathway 
helped to compare differences in the cause-effect relations. KKI-WARSI for example succeeded to 
obtain district permits for forest dependent communities to manage their own natural resources in 9 
of the 16 villages within the 2011-2014 period: Delays in the other 7 villages were explained by a 
different political will of the districts involved. This comparison confirmed KKI-WARSI’s contribution 
provided that districts have a political will in line with the project. 
First explain the outcome then assess the role of the project (step 6 and 7): First explaining outcomes 
and then assessing the role of the project helped to reject contributions for two projects. CRI claimed 
to have increased the number of people becoming eligible for the insurance scheme of the Ministry 
of Health through its support to an online media platform for citizen journalism and advocacy. The 
outcome was however explained by the collaborative efforts of many different actors, but not by 
CRI’s platform. REDS claimed to have increased the number of land titles for IP, but the data 
collected highlighted that IP themselves and a more conducive environment by the government 
explained the outcome.  
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 The exact number of outcomes is unknown, because we were unable to track all outcomes related to this campaign in the 
90 offices that the Oxfam Confederation has.  
 
 
Taking a critical stance towards causal claims:  The country teams were trained on the methodology 
after they had only collected insider information and constructed an ex-post ToC. At that moment in 
time, their confidence in the project explaining the outcome was already at 70 % according to the 
Bayesian theorem, leaving little room to increase it after data collection. The critical stance of the 
evaluation team were enhanced by the introduction of a practical rule of thumb: the more 
confidence the evaluators had in the project explaining the outcomes, the harder they had to 
concentrate on finding evidence to prove the contrary.  
Over time, teams developed their skills to behave as 
detectives: Becoming more acquainted with the context 
and the issue under evaluation enhanced their ability to 
identify alternative explanations. Also the identification 
of data needed (step 3) became more helpful. 
Teamwork was critical to develop this critical stance. 
Looking another time to the evidence generated we 
may conclude that increasingly data collection was 
oriented to those that could pass or fail a smoking gun 
test or a hoop test. Table 2 helped to organise the evidence available and to draw conclusions.  
Methodological challenges 
Enhancing the confidence in contribution claims is challenged by the identification of alternative 
pathways, by data collection and by establishing the relation between the contribution made for a 
particular outcome and the project’s effectiveness.  
Alternative pathways: For some projects, evaluation teams could identify many alternative pathways 
and asked themselves where to stop. For some projects it was difficult to identify alternative 
pathways and the only alternative explanation consisted of the contribution claim being rejected or 
being part of a causal package with other actors and factors.  
Data collection:  Both insider and outsider information are indispensable for increasing confidence in 
contribution claims as well is the iterative character of the evaluation process.  
The collection of insider information in India and Indonesia was partially hampered by the overseas 
partners having hardly been involved in the commissioning of the entire evaluation program9, 
limiting their sense of ownership to the evaluation. Project documents and reports did not always 
contain relevant information for the evaluators, such as reflections on the effectiveness of L&A 
strategies practiced. The information provided about the BtB campaign is an exception to this 
observation, because interview minutes with lobby targets were made available, as well as internal 
assessments of past L&A efforts, and social media data to monitor its outreach to consumers. 
The collection of outsider information from in particular other CSOs was relatively easy but often 
biased in favour of the overseas partner. Occasionally it was difficult to obtain information from CSOs 
that took a critical but informed stance. The consultation of government officials however proved to 
be difficult in India and Indonesia, because of the strict public sector protocols they have to follow 
and because overseas partners tend to not maintain relations with those officials once the project 
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 In particular that of the CIVICUS framework which became mandatory only after the Dutch NGOs and their partners 
overseas had already successfully applied for the Dutch grant framework.  
Bibhu Prasad Mohapatra:  
‘In this process the greatest learning for the 
evaluator is to get out of the counterfactual/ 
correlational definition of what is 
scientifically proximate to the 
quantitative/statistical methods of impact 
outcome. The TBE opens up a variety of 
paths and combinations to explain 
adequately contribution analysis with 
sufficient robustness’ 
 
 
has ended. Contacting public sector officials in European countries for the Oxfam campaigns was less 
difficult, but that of resource persons close to lobby targets was problematic.  
The internet proved a valuable source of information for in particular the international campaigns 
and to a lesser extent for the Indian and Indonesian projects. 
Assessing contribution in practice is not a linear but an iterative approach: Additional data 
requirements may pop up after a first round of data collection. In India and Indonesia, traveling 
distances to the project locations were often long and time consuming, and online communication 
with the projects was occasionally challenging. This hampered the iterative collection of data and 
their analysis. 
From contribution to effectiveness: The criteria set to select outcomes for contribution analysis as 
well as clustering outcomes helped to prevent biases occurring in some projects and hence also 
helped to draw conclusions with regards to their effectiveness, as requested in the call for proposals. 
However, occasionally there was a discrepancy between contribution findings and the project’s 
effectiveness. For example CWM successfully supported one trade union in the garment sector to 
lobby the government to increase the minimum wages in the sector. It supports however some 40 
other trade unions for which no outcomes were reported.  
Challenges in evaluating L&A  
The complex nature of cause-effect relations in L&A projects also highlighted three methodological 
challenges.  
Lobby targets are black boxes what do they contribute? The first section already mentioned that 
occasionally lobby targets themselves are part of the causal package, hence making cause-effect 
relations blurred. The methodology did not foresee interviews with lobby targets, assuming a bias in 
answers given and the possible interference of the evaluator in project – lobby target relations: Little 
information has become available about these targets themselves, turning them into a black box. On 
one occasion such inside information became available after the evaluation, nuancing the findings of 
the project’s contribution.  
Insider strategies, difficult to assess: Many L&A projects use both insider and outsider strategies to 
influence their lobby targets. Except for Oxfam’s BtB campaign, it was difficult to obtain insider 
information that helped to assess the extent to which lobbying was successful. Progress reports 
usually present outputs and occasionally outcomes achieved, but do not report on lessons learned 
with regards to insider strategies. Oxfam’s meeting minutes and internal assessments by lobbyists 
themselves provided the information necessary.  
Suitability of outcomes for contribution analysis:  Most outcomes identified consisted of policy 
changes and changes in their implementation by the lobby target. The most obvious reason for this is 
the emphasis on clearly defined outcomes achieved, together with the existence of evidence. 
Therefore more subtle changes, such as those in agenda-setting, may have been overlooked.  
Another category of outcomes that might not be suitable for the methodology used, unless major 
financial resources are available, consists of those global L&A processes that engage many actors, as 
was the case with the first draft version of the new safeguards of the World Bank that Oxfam tried to 
influence.  
 
 
Discussion 
This section positions our methodological experiences with more recent publications related to TBE 
and to the evaluation of L&A efforts.  
Process tracing and contribution analysis 
The past few years have seen an increased emphasis on enhancing the confidence in contribution 
claims through configurational and generative evaluation approaches, introducing a shift from 
assessing impact to confidence (Befani and Mayne, 2014; Befani and Stedman-Bryce, 2016). Punton 
and Welle (2015) published a process tracing evaluation protocol and Befani and Stedman-Bryce 
(2016) merged contribution analysis with process tracing, with ‘contribution tracing’ being coined as 
a new methodology. 
Our methodology could have gained in rigor by assessing the plausibility of the ToC prior to data 
collection (Befani and Mayne, 2014) and by further specifying the identification of data needed to 
confirm or reject pathways (step 3). Befani and Stedman-Bryce (2016) clearly make a distinction into 
data needs that confirm what one would expect-to-see (Hoop test) and those that one would love-
to-see (Smoking gun test). Whereas the first type of data would confirm an explanation but not rule 
out others, the second type would confirm an explanation and decrease the confidence in others.  
Some of our pending questions also appear in recent literature: We first made an inventory of 
outcomes realised. Most researchers however first identify the contribution claim, take this as the 
default pathway and only later address alternative explanations (Mayne, 2012; Befani and Mayne, 
2014; Befani and Stedman-Bryce, 2016). This would be in line with theory-testing process tracing 
instead of OEPT, and it would further strengthen the relation between the impact assessment and 
the program effectiveness according to Punton and Welle (2015b). Their examples however do not 
support this: they are in line with our methodology of first identifying outcomes realised and treating 
alternative explanations on equal footing with that of the intervention, not excluding their rejection 
as an explanation of the outcome. According to them process tracing is not possible if no outcomes 
are achieved, qualifying process tracing as an ex-post evaluation method.  
Evaluating L&A 
This section reflects upon the three challenges encountered with regards to the nature of L&A 
projects: Lobby targets remaining a black box; insider strategies difficult to assess and; not all 
outcomes being suitable for an impact assessment based upon our methodology 
Lobby targets are black boxes. Tsui, Hearn, and Young (2014) mention two methods that could 
possibly increase access to information on lobby targets. These are a story telling method developed 
by Action Aid, which looks similar to Outcome Harvesting (Wilson-Grau & Britt, 2012) and the 
Bellwether method (Blair; in Tsui, Hearn, and Young, 2014). Both seek to interview experts or those 
close to the lobby target. Similar efforts were made by the evaluation teams, but frequently public 
sector officials and those in multi-lateral institutions were not eager to provide inside information. 
Getting more insight into lobby targets remains a challenge.  
Insider strategies difficult to assess. Jones (2011) confirms our challenges encountered with 
systematic data collection through lobbyists themselves. The most helpful information to track 
consists of lobbyists recording meetings, tracking people, interviewing key informants and probing 
influence. These data usually do not appear in regular progress reports of L&A projects. 
 
 
Developmental Evaluation (Patton, 2012) and Outcome Mapping (Earl, Carden and Smutylo, 2001) 
could support the evaluation of insider strategies, provided that lobbyists engage in a regular critical 
reflection on what worked and what not (Tsui and Lucas B, 2013).  
Suitability of outcomes for impact assessment though our methodology. Our evaluation methodology 
possibly has overlooked more subtle outcomes related to agenda-setting. Outcome mapping steps, in 
particular setting behavioural markers could have complemented the first step of our methodology; 
the identification of outcomes (Earl, Carden and Smutylo, 2001; Jones, 2011).   
Outcomes of global influencing processes such as the publication of the first draft of the new 
safeguards by the World Bank would benefit from an additional social network analysis (Tsui and 
Lucas, 2013); a major challenge however consists of conducting a baseline and end line analysis (Tsui, 
Hearn and Young, 2014), because actors step in and out the influencing process at different times.  
Future directions for evaluating L&A impact  
Our experiences with the evaluation methodology that combined process tracing and contribution 
analysis elements made us realise that we could enhance our confidence in contribution claims by 
clustering outcomes that were the result of one pathway and by taking a critical stance towards the 
claim before data gathering.  
Clustering outcomes enabled us to assess under what conditions cause-effect relations exist and 
when not. When these relations are at the centre of the project, they help to draw conclusions about 
the effectiveness of the L&A programs; but we also highlighted the possible discrepancies based 
upon our methodology of explaining outcomes and that of  concluding about effectiveness.  
The critical stance was most reflected during the formulation of the ToC (step 2), immediately 
including alternative explanations, in explicitly including step 3 to first reflect upon data needed that 
are strong enough to confirm or reject a pathway and in the analysis done in step 5. These steps 
could have gained in quality if we would have assessed the plausibility in the ToC prior to data 
collection and if we would have elaborated further guidance for step 3 to identify data that would 
pass the Hoop or Smoking Gun test.  
We also encountered challenges with regards to data collection and concluded that it is in particular 
difficult to obtain information from lobby targets and about insider L&A strategies.  
The confidence in contribution claims by future L&A projects could be increased through the 
following:  
 Where possible a baseline study would already include a plausibility assessment of the ex-
ante ToC and identify other actors and factors that are attempting to influence the same 
lobby targets on similar issues. For more subtle outcomes, progress markers could be 
developed in line with Outcome Mapping.  
 Monitoring systems should preferably be able to take stock of (intermediate) outcomes 
achieved and of L&A strategies: They should in particular document insider strategies, and 
track changes with regards to other actors and factors that influence decision makers. Where 
necessary a developmental evaluator could support such critical reflections.  
 The ex-post evaluation, taking into account our lessons learned and incorporating new 
insights, would be built upon the information already mobilised through the baseline and 
monitoring system, and would assess these against information obtained from critical 
friends, experts and those close to the lobby targets.  
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Annex 1: Description of the L&A projects and results 
Organisations evaluated 
India 
CECOEDECON organised farmers in 500 village committees and federating structures at district and  
state level in Rajasthan. The evaluation focussed on two L&A outcomes: one consisting of genetically 
modified seed (GMS) trials being stopped by the state, and the other being the establishment of 
three procurement centres at district level that purchase local agricultural produce against minimum 
support prices fixed by the government.  
REDS in Tumkur district of Karnataka state supports the creation of an indigenous people (IP) 
movement with the establishment of 1,000 IP village councils and similar structures at higher 
administrative levels including an IP parliament at state level. The evaluation team focused on the 
land titles obtained by the movement.  
CWM  supports 41 trade unions of people mainly working in the informal sector, such as the 
garment, domestic and plantation sector. The evaluation concentrated on CWM’s support to a trade 
union defending the interests of mainly women working in the garment sector in Karnataka state.  
 
 
NNET is a collaboration between several religious organisations that defends the rights of tribal 
communities in three states of India since 2007.  Its contribution to increase tribal communities’ 
access to government schemes and programs was assessed.  
Indonesia 
CRI promotes citizen journalism and advocacy through the formation of community forums, followed 
by community radios and their integration in an online media platform. The online forum’s 
contribution to increasing the number of people becoming eligible for the insurance schemes of the 
Ministry of Health was assessed.  
ELSAM is a human rights organisation that positions itself as a resource and information centre. Its 
contribution to the amendment by National Parliament in October 2014 of the 2006 Indonesian Law 
on Witnesses and Victim Protection was assessed. 
NTFP-EP promotes forest conservation through the empowerment of forest dependent communities. 
The evaluators assessed its contribution to the endorsement by districts of natural resource maps 
and development plans made by local communities in four villages. 
Indonesian Conservation Community WARSI (KKI-WARSI) promotes Community Based Forest 
Management (CBFM) as a strategy to grant indigenous people forest concession rights. The 
assessment concentrated on KKI-WARSI having been able to mainstream CBFM into West Sumatra 
Province’s forestry policy, as well having been able to support indigenous people in 9 out of the 
targeted 16 villages in obtaining village forest concession permits from three districts.  
Global 
The Oxfam Confederation’s global land grab campaign aimed to reduce irresponsible large scale land 
acquisitions (LSLA) by, amongst others, companies and investors. Oxfam’s contribution to the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) changing its lending policies and regulations with regards 
LSLA was assessed. 
Its second campaign was the Behind the Brands (BtB) campaign, which engages the world’s ten 
biggest Food and Beverage Companies (FBC) in a ‘race to the top’ to improve their policies and 
practices with regards to gender, land acquisitions and other themes. The evaluation assessed 
Oxfam’s contribution with regards to gender mainstreaming and to stopping land grabbing in the 
value chains of these FBCs.  
Evaluation findings 
Table 3 
Results of the impact assessment 
Organisation 
involved in L&A 
Nature of the 
outcome 
Pathways of the 
organisation/alternative 
pathways 
Contribution 
explained by: 
Explaining factors of 
contribution 
CECOEDECON  Improved access 
public services 
 GMS trails 
stopped by State 
Government 
1. CECOEDECON  
2. The movement it supports 
3. Other actors and factors 
Causal package of 1 
and 2 
1. Charismatic 
leadership 
CECOEDECON 
2. 30 years of 
movement building 
REDS More land titles for 
IPs given by district 
government 
1. L&A by REDS with IP 
movement and others 
2. IP movement itself 
3. Conducive environment by 
Causal package of 2 
and 3 and not by 
REDS 
1. 30 years of 
movement 
support. 
2. REDS less effective 
 
 
state itself.  because changed 
its orientation. 
CWM State Government 
increases minimum 
wages in garment 
sector 
1. Non-traditional trade unions 
+ CWM  
2. International pressure
10
  
3. Government itself 
Causal package of 1 
and other actors 
1. Most significant 
support by CWM 
dates from 2008.  
2. Trade unions are 
very powerful 
NNET Improved access to 
public services 
1. Para Legal Personnel  trained 
by NNET  
2. Other organisations  
3.  Government and village 
councils  
4. Better roads and 
communications  
1 provides sufficient 
but not necessary 
relation  
1. Only performing 
PLP make 
contributions 
2. NNET’s 
organisational 
performance is still 
weak 
CRI  More people have 
access to public 
health insurance 
scheme of Ministry 
of Health (MoH) 
1. Public pressure built up by 
CRI's online platform of 
community radios  
2. Insider L&A strategy by CRI 
with others 
3. MoH itself 
2 is a causal package 
of mainly other 
actors:  
1. Doubts about 
outcome being 
achieved:  
2. CRI’s role through 
the platform is 
rejected 
ELSAM Revised Law on 
Witnesses and 
Victim Protection 
approved 
1. ELSAM providing information 
a draft law to an NGO-CSO 
coalition 
2. Human right victims taking 
the initiative with the 
coalition without ELSAM 
3. Government led Human 
Rights commission lobbying 
parliament 
Causal package of 1. 
ELSAM as a member 
of the NGO-CSO 
coalition  
1. ELSAM has 
legitimacy of both 
the Government 
and civil society  
2. Law adopted just 
before election 
time  
NTFP-EP  4 CBFM plans 
endorsed by 
districts 
  Outcomes not 
realised 
KKI-WARSI 9/16 village forest 
concession permits 
delivered by three 
districts 
1. KKI-Warsi’s support to village 
communities 
2. Other NGOs  
3. Districts perceives net 
benefits of village 
concessions vis-à-vis private 
sector concessions 
Causal package of 1 
and 3 
 
And previous L&A 
activities by KKI-
WARSI for legal 
village concessions 
1. Village 
communities do 
heavily rely upon 
external support  
2. KKI-WARSI has the 
technical 
knowledge and 
legitimacy 
Oxfam’s land 
grab 
IFC changes its  
regulations with 
regards to 
investments 
provided to 
corporation for 
large scale land 
acquisitions directly 
or through financial 
intermediary 
organisations. 
1. NGO's including Oxfam use 
public pressure and directly 
engage 
2. Internal accountability 
systems within IFC redress 
the situation 
3. Oxfam’s original land freeze 
Causal package 
between 1, 2 and 3.  
 
And an external 
triggering factor 
1. Oxfam is respected 
by many actors 
including the World 
Bank.  
2. Association of the 
IFC with human 
rights atrocities 
around land in 
Honduras was a 
trigger. 
Oxfam’s Behind 
the Brands 
campaign 
1. 3 FBCs  commit 
and act to 
integrate gender 
in the cocoa 
value chain  
2. 4 FBCs commit 
and act to zero-
land grabbing 
1. A combination of 
interventions by Oxfam 
2. Other actors and factors 
1, in combination 
+Feasibility of 
Oxfam’s requests + 
FBC being known by 
consumers 
(branding) 
BtB themes 
addressed and BtB 
approach were rather 
unique 
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 In 2013, an 8 store garment factory collapsed in Bangladesh, causing an international upheaval. 
 
 
 
